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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1946.



SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES.

From: S. Klaus

Subject: JIOA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
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General Hilldring's office called me on Friday, July 26, 1946, and asked that I see him this morning at 11:30. Accordingly, I saw him in his office. Mr. Gross came in toward the end of the conference which lasted about a half hour.

Mr. Hilldring opened by asking me whether I had heard about what had happened here on Thursday night. I told him I had not. He then told me that he had had a conference on this subject with Secretary Byrnes and that there had been conferences with Secretary Patterson and various Generals and Admirals. I could not make out what the sequence of evidence was from what General Hilldring said, but the following items appeared to comprise what had taken place:

1. Secretary Byrnes had attended a dinner party at which Arde Bulova, the watch manufacturer had been present, in which Bulova had mentioned the existence of a concentration camp for German scientists at Wright Field and have asked that four scientists be sent back.
2. General Hilldring had investigated the story and had concluded that the allegation was true.
3. Secretary Patterson had chided General Hilldring or Secretary Byrnes on this subject.
4. Secretary Byrnes had insisted that no concentration camps of any kind would be maintained in the United States and the Germans were to be let loose or sent back, and that in fact, all prisoners of war were to be returned (about 900,000 he said).

5. Secretary

I said that the new program would involve the Army with the Attorney General, not with us, and that the Army would be compelled to introduce a better CIC system if we were to rely on Army investigations for visa issuance.

I told General Hilldring about the Lord Beveridge Committee report on 625 scientists, which I said Herbert Cummings had gone over to investigate, and I told him about the VDI connections. I said that VDI had all German engineers and that six of the ten names we had had tentatively showed VDI membership. I said that under those circumstances we could not grant visas without knowing much more than CIC investigations had so far given us. General Hilldring's reply was that we would have to take certain risks in these cases.

After Gross came in the matter of exploitation came up. I pointed out that none of the Services appear to have any intention of exploiting these persons since the Navy and the Army had produced no names, the Navy, with one exception, had indicated that it was not interested, and had no funds for exploitation, and that even the Air Forces had indicated that after three months they intended to turn the scientists over to industry. I pointed out that there was an indication that some of these persons were actually intended for industry but might come through the Army or Navy as a device for evading the limitations imposed in the Commerce program. I called attention to the Bausch & Lomb story. I pointed out further that when these people came to the United States they would be free of all controls and could promptly go to the Soviet Union, Argentina, and to other countries which had been asking for such people.

I told General Hilldring that while this was a SWNCC program, it seemed important to me to note that the people who were to be allowed to come to the United States without restraints were people whose occupations were declared to be unlawful in Germany, such as atomic physicists, and that these were precisely the men whom the Army wanted to deny to the Russians by immigration to the United States. I said it seemed to me that the military government, if these men were not dependable, should be dealt with in Germany. General Hilldring said that Dr. Bush was opposed to bringing such persons to the United States; I replied that these were the very persons whom the present program was designed to bring here and that Dr. Bush's views were

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5. Secretary Byrnes had asked General Hilldring to watch the entire matter for him.

6. General Hilldring had told the Army people that the denial program was to be discarded and that General McNarney should undertake to look up those Germans who were not safe with respect to movement to the United States.

7. General Hilldring had decided that all other German scientists should be permitted to come here in military custody (but not in concentration camps) pending a determination of their immigration possibilities.

General Hilldring told me that the document I had prepared indicated to him that none of these people would qualify to come into this country. I told him that he had apparently been misinformed or misled as to just what the State Department had stood for. I told him that from the beginning we had insisted that all the Germans and their families who were wanted here should be brought in immediately by the Army, and that immigration should be considered later; I told him that the directive which I have written covered only the problem of immigration, not the problem of bringing the scientists into the United States. I emphasized to him further that the Visa Division Chief had insisted that under the law and for his protection a written directive from the President was necessary, and further that he wanted the Committees of Congress to know that this was going on, and why. I pointed out that politically the situation was delicate because we would be granting preferences and special treatment to German scientists that we were not giving to Belgians, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, etc., and that this called for more than a SWNCC directive. General Hilldring said he appreciated the Visa Division's view and that they were entitled to that protection.

I pointed out to General Hilldring furthermore that the Army had not conducted any thoroughgoing CIC investigation; that the Army and the Navy had submitted no names for immigration, and that the Air Forces had only submitted a tentative list of ten names. I said that the new program proposed by General Hilldring called for a complete re-thinking of the problem since it had all been based heretofore on the premise of denial and the impossibility of controlling the Germans in Germany.

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not being followed. He said then that these people would have to be excluded. I then touched upon the point that others were in related fields considered dangerous. It was obvious that General Hilldring had not explored this situation to the full. The meeting ended on his statement that considerable more thought was desirable. I told him that I would keep in touch with him through O'Sullivan.

I called Colonel Gross, General Hilldring's Deputy, and told him that there seemed to be some confusion as to just what was the next step. I pointed out that if the denial aspects were to be discarded, the SWNCC directives would have to be rewritten and possibly on the basis of no exploitation by the military forces at all unless they produced individual names. Colonel Gross suggested that nothing be done until General Hilldring thought the matter through some more, since it apparently required additional thinking.

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